INTRODUCTION

Ann McGuire
Under the Federal To rt Claims Act of 1946 {FfCA),2 the United States is liable for tort claims "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances."3 This limited waiver of sovereign immunity,4 subject to certain ex ceptions,5 grants federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over civil tort actions against the United States for money damages.6
The Act requires a claimant suing the United States to file her claim first with the appropriate administrative agency.7 If the agency denies the claim, it mails a notice of final denial, and the claimant then has six months to file the claim against the United States in federal court.8 Failure to file suit within six months from the date of mailing and within two years after the claim accrues9 "forever bar [ s ] " the claimant from seeking relief in the courts under the FfCA.10 The Act does not specify to whom the agency must send the notice of denial. The Department of Justice (DOJ), charged by Congress with administering the Act,U therefore promulgated 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a), which requires that the agency send notice to the claimant, her attorney, or her legal representative.12
The courts have applied this regulation to claims arising under the Act nearly uniformly, interpreting it to permit an agency to send notice to any of the recipients enumerated in the regulation. They generally have dismissed claimants' arguments that the notice of denial should have been sent only to them, or alternatively, to their attorneys, often with a succinct reference to the language of section 14.9.13 In late 1996, however, the Ninth Circuit let slip the dogs of war and held in Graham v. United States that section 14.9( a) requires that the notice of denial be sent only to the claimant's at-
28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) provides:
A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Fe deral agency within two years after such claim accrues or unless action is begun within six months after the date of mailing, by certified or regis tered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented.
See also 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).
9. Despite the disjunctive in § 2401(b), which might lead the unwary to believe that a plaintiff need satisfy only one of the two conditions specifi ed therein, the courts have held that a suit is time-barred unless it is filed within two years after it accrues and within six months of final denial by the agency. See, e.g., Houston v. United States Postal Serv., 823 F.2d 896, 902 (5th Cir. 1987) ; Willis v. United States, 719 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1983) ; Schuler v. United States, 628 F.2d 199, 201 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ; infra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
See 28 U.S.C. § 240l(b).
11. See 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1994) (directing agencies to adjust claims "in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Attorney General").
12. See 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) {1998) ("Fmal denial of an administrative claim shall be in writing and sent to the claimant, his attorney, or legal representative by certified or regis tered mail.").
13. See, e.g., Hanson v. United States, 908 F.2d 257, 258 (8th Cir. 1990 ) (rejecting under the language of § 14.9 claimant's argument that the American Bar Association's Model Code of Professional Responsibility Rule 4.2, which prohibits an attorney from co=unicating directly with a represented party, mandates sending notice only to claimant's attorney); Hatchell v. United States, 776 F.2d 244, 245 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the notice of denial sent to claimant's attorney satisfied the requirements of § 14.9); Dyniewicz v. United States, 742 F.2d 484, 485 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding that sending the notice to claimant complied with § 14.9); Childers v. United States, 442 F.2d 1299 , 1302 (5th Cir. 1971 ) (citing § 14.9 to dismiss plaintiff 's argument that mailing the notice to claimant is mandatory); Robinson v. United States, No. CIV.A.92-4869, 1993 WL 74841, at *7 n.3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 1993 (finding that the Drug Enforcement Agency was "authorized by law," i.e., 28 C.F.R. § 14.9, to send the notice of final denial to the claimant and therefore did not breach its ethical duty not to communicate directly with represented parties).
[ Vol. 97:1034 torney, if the agency knows that the claimant is represented.14 The court justified its override of the language of the regulation primar ily on the grounds of "prevailing ethical standards. "15 Sending the notice to the claimant, the Ninth Circuit held, violates the ethical rule that attorneys may not communicate directly with parties they know to be represented.16 Because the Bureau of Prisons sent the notice of denial to Graham instead of to her attorney, the court permitted Graham's suit to proceed despite its late filing.17
The Ninth Circuit's holding, while well-meaning, is perplexed in the extreme. This Note contends that courts should follow the traditional reading of section 14.9(a) and uphold the propriety of notice sent to either the claimant or her attorney. Courts seeking to grant relief to an unfortunate claimant should look to the principles of equity, not to a tortured reading of section 14.9. Part I argues that the traditional judicial interpretation of the Act's notice-of denial requirement, unlike the Ninth Circuit's reading, accords with the judicial deference properly given to administrative regulations, the plain language of 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a), and the established 14. See Graham v. United States, 96 F.3d 446, 449 (9th Cir. 1996) . Katherine Graham, a federal prisoner, filed an administrative claim with the Department of Justice's Bureau of Prisons. Graham listed her attorney on the claim form and her attorney confirmed his repre sentation via mutual correspondence with the Bureau. When the Bureau eventually denied the claim, however, it sent the notice of denial directly to Graham, who, not realizing its importance, threw it away. The attorney, assuming that the agency had not acted on the claim, waited the six months specified in 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) and then filed suit in district court. In opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss the suit as untimely, Graham argued that the mailing of the notice to her did not trigger the statute of limitations because the Bureau should have sent the notice to her attorney. The district court held that although the Bureau had "inadvertently " mailed the notice to the claimant, the regulation authorized such action, and dismissed the suit. The traditional reading of 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a), which permits an agency to send notice to either the claimant, her attorney, or her legal representative,18 enjoys strong support from a number of sources. Section I.A demonstrates that the doctrines of judicial def erence to agencies' interpretations of statutes and their own regula tions dictate that courts should regard as authoritative both the DOJ's regulation and its reading of that regulation. Section I.B then contends that the plain language of the regulation, interpreted in accordance with the canons of construction, justifies a traditional reading by the DOJ or other agency. Section I.B also argues that the drafters of the regulation intended to give agencies discretion in choosing the recipient of the denial notice, and that courts should give effect to that intent because the usual justification for overrid ing regulatory text -clear frustration of drafters' intent -is not applicable here.
A. To Th ine Own Agencies Be Tr ue: Th e Commitment to
Ju dicial Deference
The principles of judicial deference to administrative agencies' interpretations of statutes and of their own regulations demand that courts respect the traditional interpretation of 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a). Given broad discretion by the FTCA to interpret the statute,19 the DOJ decreed that notice may be sent either to the claimant or to her representative. Part I.A.1 first asserts that because section 14.9(a) is a reasonable and permissible construction of the Act's notice provisions, a court may not fashion, wrest, and bow its own reading of the statute to require that agencies send notice only to 18. For the sake of succinctness, this Note does not make separaty arguments regarding a claimant's legal representative. Instead, this Note can adequately address the role of a legal representative with its arguments regarding attorneys. See Graham, 96 F.3d at 448 (calling Graham's attorney her "legal representative").
19. See 28 U. S.C. § 267 2 (1994) (providing that agencies adjust claims "in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Attorney General"). [Vol. 97:1034 attorneys. Part I.A.2 then argues that because the judiciary also owes deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations, a court should ratify the DOJ's construction of section 14.9(a), which permits notice to be sent to either a claimant or her attorney. This Part concludes that these doctrines of judicial deference re quire that courts direct policy concerns to the political branches of the government. Because neither the DOJ nor Congress has found section 14.9(a) and its traditional interpretation to be so rank and gross in nature as to require changing, courts should accede to the language of the regulation and its implementation by agencies and allow agencies to send notice to the claimant.
Chevron Deference
Under the principles of judicial deference to agencies' interpre tations of statutes, a court should defer to the regulation promul gated by the DOJ, which allows agencies to choose the recipient of the notice of denial. The Supreme Court has held, most notably in Chevron U.S.A., In c. v. Na tural Resources Defense Co uncil, 20 that when a court reviews an administrative agency's interpretation of a statutory provision the agency is charged with administering, the court must accept the agency's "reasonable" or "permissible" con struction, if the statute is silent or ambiguous on the issue in ques tion. 21 The interpretation offered by the agency, moreover, need not be the only permissible interpretation or even one the court itself would have reached.22 "If the agency regulation is not in con flict with the plain language of the statute," the Supreme Court makes clear, "a reviewing court must give deference to the agency's 20. 467 U. S. 837 (1984) . Earlier Supreme Court cases also expounded the principles of deference to agency interpretations of statutes. See, e.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) .
21. See Chevron, 461 U.S. at 842-44; see also KMart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291-92 (1988) . The Court in Chevron made clear that if Congress "explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill , there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation." 467 U.S. at 843-44. If, on the other hand, Congress directly addressed the issue and its intent is clear, the court must reject any construction that is contrary to the clear congressional intent. See 467 U.S. at 842-43, 843 n.9.
Later cases discussed what sort of ambiguity courts require in the statute in order to proceed to the determination of whether the agency's interpretation is reasonable or permis sible and therefore entitled to deference. A minority of courts maintain that any ambiguity whatsoever is enough for a court to proceed to the reasonableness/permissibility determina tion. See, e.g., Tataranowicz v. Sullivan, 959 F.2d 268, 276-77 (D.C. Cir. 1992 ) (finding ambi guity in a statutory caption sufficient). The majority view, however, requires that the ambiguity be substantial. A court must first apply the traditional tools of statutory construc tion; only if the court cannot thereby discern congressional intent does it analyze the agency's interpretation. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446-48 (1987 agency's interpretation.30 Nothing in the Act, its amendments, or its legislative history demonstrates congressional rejection of the DOJ's interpretation of the notice requirement. Because the Ninth Circuit "may not substitute its own construction of a statutory pro vision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency,"31 the Graham court should have confirmed the lan guage of section 14.9.
Bowles Deference
The Ninth Circuit is further curtailed to the fair proportion of the traditional reading by a second prescript of judicial deference. In addition to giving deference to the regulation promulgated by the DOJ, a court should also give deference to the DOJ's interpre tation of its own regulation and allow the DOJ and its constituent subdivisions to choose from among the recipients the Attorney General listed in section 14.9(a). The Supreme Court held in Bowles v. Seminole Rock and Sand Company32 and subsequent cases33 that when the meaning of an administrative construction it self is in doubt, an agency's interpretation of its own regulation is controlling unless that interpretation is "plainly erroneous or incon sistent with the regulation. "34 As with Chevron deference, an agency's approach need not be the only one it could have permissi bly adopted, nor even one the court itself would have chosen.35
The Bureau of Prisons (the Bureau), a subordinate arm of the Justice Department,36 has interpreted section 14.9(a) in conformity S. 332, 354-59 (1989) ; see also, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324 , 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1995 ; Kester v. Campbell, 652 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1981) .
34. Bowles, 325 U.S. at 414. This kind of deference, the Court noted, is "even more clearly in order" than deference to agency interpretations of statutes. See Udall v. Tallman 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) ; see also Mausolf v. Babbitt, 125 F.3d 661, 667 (8th Cir. 1997 ); Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Public Serv. Commn., 909 F.2d 352, 356 (9th Cir. 1990 ). The Court ex plained that while congressional intent or constitutional principles may sometimes be rele vant in choosing a construction, the "ultimate criterion" is the administrative interpretation.
See Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 512; Bowles, 325 U.S. at 414.
35
. A court need only find that the agency's construction is sufficiently reasonable and consistent with the wording of the regulation and the statute under which the regulation was promulgated. See Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 702 (1991) ; Young v. Com munity Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 981 (1986) ; see also General Elec. Co., 53 F.3d at 1327 (noting that courts may defer even "where the agency's reading of the statute would not be obvious to the most astute reader" (internal quotation marks omitted)). with that regulation's plain language: the Bureau sends notice either to claimants or to attomeys.37 While the Bureau may have a "practice" of sending notice to counsel,38 doing so is not an obliga tion. Because the DOJ's interpretation of section 14.9(a) via the Bureau39 is consistent with the regulation, a court complying with the Bowles doctrine should defer to the DOJ's construction and al low notice to be sent to either a claimant or her attorney.40
Obliged to acknowledge the pertinence of at least the Chevron doctrine,41 the Graham court charges once more unto the breach and declares that the Bureau did not follow its own interpretation of the regulation in question. The Ninth Circuit claims that the Buthe Bureau and the discharge of the Bureau's duties. See 18 U.S.C. § § 4041, 4042 (1994) Compare, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 748 F.2d 291, 292 (5th Cir. 1984 ) (reporting that the Veterans Administration (VA) sent notice to claimant) with Berti v. V.A. Hosp., 860 F.2d 338, 339 (9th Cir. 1988 ) (reporting that the VA sent notice to claimant's eounsel).
38. See Graham, 96 F.3d at 450 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
39. See supra note 36. Even if a court considered the Bureau to be a separate agency from the DOJ, however, the traditional construction of § 14.9(a) would still prevail. If the Bureau of Prisons were a different agency than the DOJ, the Bureau's interpretation of the FTCA's notice provisions or of § 14.9(a) would not merit deference; under Ch evron, the proper inquiry would be solely regarding the DOJ's interpretation. See American Rivers, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commn., 129 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1997 ); California Natl. Guard v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 697 F.2d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 1983) . And under Chev ron, the result is clear: courts (and other administrative agencies) must accede to the DOJ's interpretation of the statutory notice provisions, i.e., § 14.9(a), which allows notice to be sent to a represented claimant. See supra notes 20-31 and accompanying text.
40. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) . In fact, a court might have rendered the Bureau infirm of purpose if the agency had interpreted § 14.9(a) as the Ninth Circuit has. Construing § 14.9(a) to direct notice to be sent only to known counsel is inconsistent with that regulation, given § 14.9(a)'s "or" language. See infra section I.B (discussing the regulation's plain language and arguing that courts must give effect to that language). Courts will invalidate an agency interpretation inconsistent with the wording of the regulation. See United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872-73 (1977 reau's correspondence with Graham's counsel42 showed that the Bureau intended to deal solely with the attorney, and that the Bu reau therefore follows the Graham majority's interpretation of sec tion 14.9(a).43 This mumpsimus ascends the highest heaven of invention, but does not hold up under the applicable case law or the facts. By sending notice alternatively to claimants and to counsel,44 the Bureau has demonstrated that the DOJ interprets section 14.9(a) to allow for a choice of notice recipients. Under Bowles, a court should defer to that interpretation.45 The "or" in section 14.9(a) and the Bureau's application of that disjunctive denote a foregone conclusion: the Ninth Circuit should have adhered to the principles of judicial deference and upheld the sending of the notice to Graham.
The FTCA gives the DOJ license to issue regulations interpret ing the Act. Policy arguments regarding those regulations "should be addressed to legislators or administrators, not to judges."46 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) and the DOJ's interpretation of it are reason able47-and thereby hangs a tale. Had the DOJ or Congress agreed with the Ninth Circuit's perception of the impropriety of sending notice directly to a represented claimant, either one could have changed the policy at some time during the twenty years since the regulation was enacted.48 Instead, they acquiesced in the findings of the courts that heeded the regulation's "or."49 Under the princi ples of judicial deference articulated by the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit itself, absent exceptional circumstances50 courts should approve the discretion the statute and regulation give to ad ministrative agencies.
42. See supra note 14.
43. See Graham, 96 F.3d at 449-50. Giving deference to the Bureau's blunder of sending the notice to the claimant, the majority declares, would be improperly applying the Ch evron doctrine to the "rubber-stamping (of] an after-the-fact rationalization of a mistake." 96 F.3d at 450. see also Stedman v. Pederson, 875 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1989 Yet the unambiguous language of the regulation52 requires that courts approve whatever recipient the agency chooses, be it the claimant or her attorney. This section argues that the traditional reading of section 14.9(a), which allows notice of denial to be sent to either the claimant or her attorney, frustrates neither the regula tion's plain meaning nor the purposes of the regulation and the stat utory notice provisions it effects. This section makes clear, furthermore, that the evidence of the DOJ's intent in drafting sec tion 14.9(a) supports the traditional interpretation of the regulation.
The text of a regulation or statute is the accepted starting point for interpretation.53 With exquisite reason, courts have agreed that the purpose and meaning of statutes and regulations are best indi cated by the "ordinary meaning" of the words used.54 The judici ary, furthermore, is loath to assume that the drafters' work product is merely full of sound and fury, signifying nothing: the courts have a duty to give effect, if possible, to every word and phrase used in a regulation.55 In short, the plain meaning controls.56
The text of 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) is clear.57 The regulation pro vides: "Final denial of an administrative claim shall be in writing and sent to the claimant, his attorney, or legal representative by certified or registered mail."58 In common usage, the word "or" 52. The regulation provides: "Fmal denial of an administrative claim shall be in writing and sent to the claimant, his attorney, or legal representative by certified or registered mail." 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) (1998 
57.
A disagreement between courts as to the interpretation of a statute or regulation does not make the statute or regulation ambiguous for purposes of plain-language analysis. See Jones v. Brown, 41 F.3d 634, 639 (Fed. Cir. 1994 ).
58. 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) (emphasis added). [Vol. 97:1034 indicates a choice among all of the concepts which surround it.59 Rather than following the Ninth Circuit's attempt to fright the words out of their right sense and ignore part of the text, courts should presume the usual disjunctive usage of "or" and allow an agency sending a notice of denial to choose between the claimant and her attorney.6 0 Giving effect to section 14.9(a)'s text does not obstruct the DOJ's intent in promulgating the regulation or the aim of the FTCA's notice provisions. A court may ignore the plain language of a regulation only when straightforward application of the text would lead to absurd results, ones that clearly frustrate the drafters' intent. 61 In Will is v. United States, 62 for example, the Second Cir cuit held that Congress intended the "or" in section 2401(b) of the FTCA 63 to mean "and. "64 Otherwise, a claimant who filed a claim with the administrative agency within two years of the claim's ac crual could thereafter bring a claim in a district court at any time in the future, no matter how heavy the interim. 65 The specter of such an absurd result,66 the court found, justified the performance of "surgery upon [the] courts, similarly wishing to avoid results thatiplainly contradict leg islative purpose, have also refused to be bound by the whips and scorns of a strict gramm atical construction.68
In contrast to these cases, however, the traditional reading of 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) is consistent with the intent of the regulation's drafter. The purpose of section 14.9(a) is to explicate the FTCA's notice provisions,69 which say only that an agency must send the notice of denial by certified or registered mail.70 Section 14.9(a) clarifies these provisions by specifying to whom the notice may be sent, and the traditional interpretation of the regulation simply con forms to the words of the regulation. Any fears that the traditional interpretation of section 14.9(a) produces "absurd or futile"71 re sults, therefore, are shallow, without instance.72
The Ninth Circuit, however, focuses not on the purpose of the regulation but rather on the purpose of the statutory notice provi sions. Reasoning that the object of the notice provisions is to "en sure that notice is given in a manner that effectively triggers the time for filing a court action,"73 the court claims that allowing an agency to send notice directly to a represented claimant thwarts that purpose.74 The court focuses on an attorney's responsibility for preparing and filing the suit,75 implying that the running of the limi- tations period should depend upon the agency's mailing the denial notice to the person who will pursue the claim. But this supposition greets the statute with sharp defiance: section 2401(b) specifically states that the statute of limitations is triggered on the date the no tice is mailed.76 Neither notice provision deems relevant the date of receipt or the recipient's role in proceeding with the claim; they simply dictate that the claimant has six months from the date of mailing to file suit. Neither receipt by nor actual notice to the claimant is required.77 An agency effectively commences the six month limitations period by sending the notice directly to a repre sented claimant.
Even assuming arguendo that satisfactory triggering of the stat ute of limitations requires receipt and comprehension by the person who will prepare the claim, the Ninth Circuit's per se rule would not advance that end enough to justify its bloody constraint on the plain language of section 14.9(a). The Graham majority's interpre tation benefits only those claimants with attorneys; its translation of section 14.9(a) cannot make an unrepresented claimant more noble in reason and better able to understand the notice she receives. The Ninth Circuit's reading, furthermore, will matter only in those cases where a represented claimant fails to timely forward the no tice to her attorney. Only then would the traditional reading puzzle the putative will of the FTCA's notice provisions; this hardly consti tutes the "plain variance" or "absurd result" necessary to ignore the text of the regulation.78 And for myriad reasons, an attorney could untimely file a claimant's suit even if the agency sends the notice of denial directly to the attorney.79 The Graham attorney-only pre- cept is a tool too rudely stamped to achieve the statute's supposed aim.
An examination of other regulations drafted by the subdivisions of the DOJ, furthermore, demonstrates the DOJ's purposefulness in designating both a represented claimant and her attorney as au thorized recipients. In other regulations but not in section 14.9(a), the Attorney General allowed limitations on the parties to whom agencies may send notice. By doing so, the DOJ evinced its most profound earnest that agencies be free to choose the recipient of the notice of denial. The regulations of the DOJ's Imm igration and Naturalization Service (INS),80 for example, direct that the INS send notice only to the attorney or representative of record if the person is represented.81 By passing on this attorney-only notice provision in the INS regulations, the DOJ has exhibited its ability to limit the entities to whom notice may be sent.82 That the Attorney General chose to employ the differing language of section 14.9(a) with respect to FTCA claims confirms its intent to allow notice under the FI'CA to be sent also to a represented claimant.83 If it An attorney could simply misplace the notice of denial, for instance, or miscalculate the date on which the limitations period expires. had had no such intent, the DOJ would have used language like that of the INS regulation. 84 The DOJ intended, as clear as is the summer sun, to authorize agencies to send notice to the claimant or her attorney. Except in extraordinary conditions that justify an exception to the traditional reading,85 courts should yield to that intent.
II. MucH Ano ABouT NoTHING: THE ETHICS OF SENDING
NOTI CE TO A REPRESENTED CLAIMANT
The traditional construction of 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) does not vio late the ethical rule against attorneys communicating with parties they know to be represented by legal counsel. 86 Because the rule itself allows for direct contact with represented parties where au thorized by law, sending the notice of denial to a represented claim ant does not contravene the rule.
The Graham majority issues its per se rule largely in response to the ethical violation it misreads into an agency's communicating di rectly with a represented claimant. The court, in refusing to dismiss Graham's suit as untimely,87 calls upon the long-standing ethical rule that prohibits attorneys from communicating with persons they know to be represented about the subject matter of the representa tion. This rule, the Ninth Circuit explains, is designed to prevent a lawyer from improperly taking advantage of a lay person's lack of 84. The language of the INS regulation also counters any claim that the DOJ included the words "the claimant " in 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) only to account for claimants not represented by an attorney. The INS Commissioner, and therefore the DOJ, see supra note 80, encompasses unrepresented claimants much more definitely in the INS regulation by providing that notice be sent to "the person himself if unrepresented. " 8 C.F.R. § 29 2.5. Had the DOJ intended for notice to be sent only to a represented claimant's attorney, furthermore, it could have accomplished that result without naming "the claimant " at all. A regulation naming the claimant's attorney as the only proper recipient of the _d enial notice would allow for the notice to be sent to the claimant if she had no attorney.
85. See infra Part III.
The general embodiment of this proscription is Rule 4. 2 of the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the repre sentation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so. legal knowledge and training.ss So while the majority's rewriting of the regulation is madness, there is commendable method in it; the court wishes to prevent agencies from causing claimants like Graham to lose their claims through their own incompetence.s9
The majority accordingly concludes that the direct contact with a represented claimant permitted by 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) violates the anti-contact ethical norm.9o
The milk of human kindness, however, cannot overcome the ex press license granted by the ethical rule itself for an administrative agency to send the notice of denial to a claimant. The rule specifi cally allows communication with a represented party if such contact is "authorized by law."91 Communications authorized by law, the drafters of the model rule elucidated, include those that are "specif ically authorized by statute, court rule, court order, statutorily au th orized regulation or judicial decisional precedent."92 Even the Ninth Circuit admits that "express legal authorization overrides ethical rules. "93 Because the FTCA directs the Attorney General to promulgate regulations to implement the Act,94 sending notice to a represented claimant under the auspices of 28 C.F.R. § 14.9( a) fits into the "authorized by law" exception to Model Rule 4.2, its pred ecessors, and its state-law progeny.95
A proponent of the Ninth Circuit's standpoint might attempt to fright the soul of this fearful adversary by arguing that the general authority the FTCA gives to the DOJ to promulgate regulations does not specifically authorize the DOJ to issue regulations that contravene ethical rules, and that such regulations are therefore "not authorized by law." Even assuming arguendo that section 14.9(a) does violate the anti-contact rule, however, the DOJ did not need specific congressional authorization to promulgate such a reg ulation. The Supreme Court has held that state law is nullified to the extent that it conflicts with a federal regulation.96 The Court added that "[a] pre-emptive regulation's force does not depend on express congressional authorization to displace state law; moreover, whether the administrator failed to exercise an option to promul gate regulations which did not disturb state law is not dispositive."97 The general grant of authority the Act gives to the DOJ, therefore, is sufficient to support the DOJ's issuance of 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a), regardless of whether that regulation contradicts the no-contact rule.9s An agency sending notice to a represented claimant in ac cordance with section 14.9(a) confines itself within the modest lim its of ethics, because doing so is authorized by law.
Refusing to be cornered by the authorized-by-law exception, however, the Graham majority screws its courage to the sticking place and asserts that the real issue is whether 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) should even be interpreted to authorize agency contact with a rep resented claimant. The court notes that the defendant "govern ment offers no guidance as to why such a blanket authorization is necessary, or even useful, in this context"99 and chides the Eighth Circuit for not explaining why the regulation should be read to au thorize such contact when it upheld the mailing of notice to a repre sented claimant in Ha nson v. United States.100 The regulation 98. Nevertheless, the judiciary has expressed some concern over an agency being allowed to misuse the "authorized by law" exception to exempt its attorneys from adherence to the rules of ethics. The single regulation called into question on these grounds is 28 C.F.R. § 77, in which the DOJ authorizes government attorneys to communicate directly with a number of represented parties, including represented defendants being investigated for "additional, different, or ongoing crimes or civil violations" and employees of a represented organization who are not "controlling individual [s] ." See 28 C.F.R. § § 77.6(e), 77.lO(c) (1994) . At least one court has held that this regulation is "not authorized by law," on the grounds that general statutes do not give sufficient authority for the DOJ to excuse its attorneys from state ethical Cir. 1993 ) (reaching the same holding regarding the "Thornburgh Memorandum," a DOJ policy statement that was the precursor to 28 C.F.R. § 77). O'Keefe, however, overlooks the Supreme Court prece dent holding that a regulation prevails over conflicting state law. See, e.g., Fi delity Fe d., 458 U.S. at 153-54; Flo rida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., 373 U.S. at 142-43. In addition, the administrative role of an attorney merely sending notice of denial to a claimant does not raise the same ethical dilemmas as an attorney performing the investigative and adversarial func tions contemplated in § 77.
99. Graham v. United States, 96 F.3d 441, 449 (9th Cir. 1996) . 100. See 96 F.3d at 449; Hanson v. United States, 908 F.2d 257 (8th Cir. 1990) . Hanson is the only other appellate decision to date on the ethical violation issue. In Ha nson, the Bu reau of Prisons sent its notice of denial by certifi ed letter to the claimant, who subsequently did not file his medical malpractice suit against the government until nearly three months after the limitations period had expired. In his appeal from the dismissal of his claim, the should therefore be interpreted, the court concludes, not as "an ex ception to prevailing ethical norms . . . [but rather] in accordance with those norms ." 101
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning, however, overlooks the fact that in all American jurisdictions but one,102 the exception is the norm. Because section 14.9(a) gives express permission to contact a repre sented party, the lawyer who does so is almost universally in com pliance with the ethical rule. Neither the government nor the judiciary need Gudgel their brains to justify the necessity or useful ness of authorizing the exception to the ethical rule. The DOJ had the authority to draft this regulation, and the regulation says an agency may send notice to the claimant. The Ninth Circuit should respect that administrative decision, rather than calling for the DOJ or another court to justify the regulation.103
An agency deciding where to send notice, therefore, need not think too precisely on the event. Regardless of whether the sending of the notice of denial to a represented claimant is intentional104 or erroneous, the agency that does so violates no ethical rule against co:t;nmunicating with represented parties.10 s claimant argued that sending the notice to him instead of to his attorney of record violated DR 7-104(a)(l) of the ABA's Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and therefore ren dered the notice ineffective. Tue Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, holding that since 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) authorized the Bureau to send the notice to the claimant, no ethical violation occurred. See Hanson, 908 F.2d at 258.
Tue Graham dissent hurls down its indignation at the majority's censure of its fellow appellate court: "No doubt the Eighth Circuit didn't offer such an explanation," the dissent retorts, "because it saw no plausible way to wring the majority's meaning from the regula tion's sparse language." Graham, 96 F.3d at 450 (Kozinski, J. , dissenting).
101. Graham, 96 F.3d at 449. 102. See supra note 91. 103. Concluding that 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) is not authorized by law, furthermore, would have dire effects on the administrative state. As the dissent points out, scores of federal regulations "authorize -perhaps even require -that notice be sent to the claimant person ally [,] " to the claimant and her attorney, or in language substantially identical to that of 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a), to the claimant or her attorney. See Graham, 96 F.3d at 452 nn.3, 5 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (listing 31 regulations requiring notice to be sent to the claimant, 7 regulations requiring notice to be sent to the claimant and her attorney, and 22 regulations requiring notice to be sent to the claimant or her attorney). Tue Graham per se rule would invalidate all of the regulations in the second and third groups, and possibly those in the first as well, a result that Congress could not have intended.
104.
If the claimant can demonstrate that the agency deliberately sent the notice to her instead of to her known counsel with the intent of causing her to miss the six-month deadline, a court could exercise its equitable discretion, toll the statute of limitations, and allow her suit to proceed. [T] he DEA was 'authorized by law' [i.e., 28 C.F.R. § 14.9] to send the final denial to the claimant."); cf. Weinstein v. Rosen bloom, 322 N.E.2d 20, 24-25 (Ill . 1974 ) (holding that notice requesting a continuance sent by an attorney directly to the adverse party, in accordance with the applicable regulation of the Illinois Industrial Commission, was "pursuant to law" and therefore did not violate Canon 7, EC 7-18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility).
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III. THE BEITER PART OF VALOR IS D ISCR ET IO N: THE EQUITABLE TOLLING ALTERNATIVE
Even though sending notice to a represented claimant is author ized by 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) and therefore does not in and of itself violate ethical norms, occasionally a court should refuse to counte nance such an action and allow a suit otherwise precluded by the statute of limitations to proceed. This Part describes some of those situations and contends that even in those cases, the Graham ma jority's per se rule prohibiting agencies from sending notice to rep resented claimants is not necessary to do good service to claimants. The per se rule, moreover, is overbroad: any represented claimant who received notice would benefit from the rule, regardless of the circumstances surrounding the running of the statute of limitations in that case.
Instead, in extreme cases courts should apply the well established principles of equitable tolling to permit suit when dis missal would be unjust. The doctrine of equitable tolling allows a court to suspend the statute of limitations temporarily on grounds of fairness to the plaintiff, usually having to do with some secret mischief the defendant sets abroach.1 0 6 Application of this doctrine strikes the proper balance between serving the interests of justice and heeding the will of Congress in enacting the FTCA's statute of limitations. Courts may refuse to ratify an agency's sending of no tice to a represented claimant, but if it were done, when 'tis done, then 'twere well it were done equitably. Section III.A first describes the judicial acceptance of equitable tolling in the FTCA context. Acknowledging the need for some flexibility in applying statutes of limitations to bar actions under the Act, section ill .A maintains that the doctrine of equitable tolling serves that need with more matter and less art than the Ninth Cir cuit's per se rule. Section III.B then presents the rules for equitable tolling under the Act, which rein in trial judges' discretion and en- The doctrine of equitable tolling addresses the concerns of both fair play and circumspection. This doctrine allows courts to over look the expiration of the limitations period, but only in cases where the facts and justice warrant such a result.
The Ninth Circuit, though it created a per se rule that does not comport with applicable law, followed the time-honored tradition of trying to protect unwitting plaintiffs. Cases where an agency sends the notice of denial to a claimant in a deliberate attempt to delay her filing of a lawsuit, for example, would justifiably catch the conscience of a court. A claimant might also deserve relief in cases where the claimant and her attorney strive mightily to preserve their legal rights but miss the limitations period because the notice was sent to the claimant and lost.107 As the Sixth Circuit notes, the claimant often is not to blame when the course of judicial redress does not run smooth:
[B]y setting short time limitation periods and establishing a maze of regulatory appeals, the government virtually assures that any but the most astute [claimant] will find his or her claim barred by some proce dural technicality once he or she gets to the United States District Court. We ... believe these plaintiff s should be able to pursue their individual claims. 1 08
The Ninth Circuit advances this notion not wisely but too well. Courts do need to have a measure of flexibility in deciding whether or not to apply statutes of limitations in order to "further the inter ests of justice."109 If a defendant sent the notice of denial to a claimant in a deliberate attempt to hinder her suit, for example, fairness to the plaintiff would warrant withholding enforcement of the statute of limitations.
But courts should not allow the exception to swallow the rule. The Ninth Circuit's per se rule against sending notice to repre-107. See, e.g., McCaffr ey v. Nylon, Inc., No. CIV.A.95-3787, 1996 WL 122710, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 1996 .
108. Andrews v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146, 152 (6th Cir. 1988 ) (internal quotation marks omitted).
109. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 , 1549 (N.D. Cal. 1987 .
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sented claimants encompasses all such claimants, regardless of the wherefores of their untimely filing. A claimant who let the limita tions period expire out of sheer forgetfulness or even apathy, for example, would still benefit from the rule. That the Ninth Circuit spurns the clear language of section 14.9(a) to secure such an over broad result is the most unkindest cut of all. By substituting the doctrine of equitable tolling, on the other hand, a court can deter mine on a case-by-case basis whether the sending of notice to a rep resented claimant justifies a departure from the license of 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a). 110 The principles of equitable tolling, unlike the Ninth Circuit's per se rule, give courts the ability to permit technically time-barred suits only when doing so would serve the interests of justice.
Because of this selectivity, courts would be more comfortable with the equitable tolling alternative. The courts, far from agreeing that the gentler gamester is the soonest winner, are generally strict in requiring compliance with statutes of limitations:
Procedural requirements ... for gaining access to the federal courts are not to be disregarded by courts out of a vague sympathy for par ticular litigants .... " [I] n the long run, experience teaches us that strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the Iaw ." 111 A court that believes that as a matter of course it must be cruel only to be kind would likely reject a per se rule that disregards the stat ute of limitations in every case where a represented claimant re ceived notice. Even a more lenient court would probably take exception to a rule that allows undeserving claimants to profit. If courts instead followed the guidelines of equitable tolling already laid out by the judiciary, they could allow an untimely suit to pro ceed only when the facts of the case warrant such a result.
B. Th e Happy Fe w: Th e Protocol of Equitable To lling under the Act
The courts have with right and conscience recognized the need for equitable tolling in actions under the FTCA. Dealing estab lished precedent a very palpable hit, the Supreme Court held in Ir win v. Department of Ve terans Affairs112 that statutes of limita tions in suits against the government, like those in actions against private defendants, may be equitably tolled.1 1 3 The majority of 110. See, e.g., McCaffrey, 1996 WL 122710. 111. Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152 (1984 (quoting Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980) ); see also McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993 A court wishing to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling can go about its business straight, because the judiciary has already clearly specified when a court should utilize equitable tolling in an FTCA case. In Irwin, the Supreme Court limited equitable tolling to cases where "the claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the statutory period, or where the complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary's miscon duct into allowing the filing deadline to pass."117 The circuit courts, agreeing that equitable tolling is an "exceptional doctrine" gener ally available only to vigilant or deceived parties,118 have clarified Irwin by specifying factors that weigh in favor of equitable tolling. These factors in c lude the plaintiff's reasonable lack of knowledge, actual or constructive, of the filing requirements; her reasonable ness in remaining unaware of the proper filing procedures; her dili gence in pursuing her legal rights; and the absence of prejudice to the defendant if the case is allowed to proceed.119 [Vol. 97:1034 In short, the courts recognize that the patient must minister to herself. They will not extend equitable tolling to cases involving inexcusable or "garden variety" neglect, 12 0 where the claimant "failed to exercise due diligence in preserving [her] legal rights." 121 For instance, a plaintiff would probably not receive the benefits of equitable tolling if she just forgot to give the notice to the earnest advocate she hired to plead for her. Similarly, the courts would almost certainly refuse to forgive a missed deadline if the cl aimant gave the notice to her attorney but the attorney simply did not file in time. The result of a case like Graham, where the claimant acci dentally throws the notice away, 122 is more difficult to predict. Gra ham's failure to exercise due diligence -to examine her mail at least cursorily and refrain from discarding letters from the agency with which she filed a claim -might prevent her from reaping the benefits of equitable tolling. 12 3 On the other hand, a court applying the principles of equitable tolling might examine Graham's educa tional and personal background, as well as her probable exp ectation that all notices would be sent to her attorney, and determine that her throwing away the notice did not sink to the level of "garden variety" neglect.124 So long as the claimant exercised the diligence 120. Black's Law Dictionary defines "excusable neglect" as a failure to take the proper steps at the proper time, not in consequence of the party's own carelessness, inattention, or willful disregard of the process of the court, but in con sequence of some unexpected or unavoidable hindrance or accident, or reliance on the care and vigilance of his counsel or on promises made by the adverse party. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 566 (6th ed. 1990). It adds that at least for purposes of a motion to vacate judgment, excusable neglect is "that neglect which might have been the act of a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances." Id.; see also Cir. 1996) . 123. See lnvin, 498 U.S. at 96 ("We have generally been much less forgiving in receiving late filings where the claimant failed to exercise due diligence in preserving his legal rights."); Baldwin County We lcome Ctr., 466 U.S. at 151 ("One who fails to act diligently cannot in voke equitable principles to excuse that lack of diligence.").
The Ninth Circuit's description of the facts does not suggest that Graham failed to see the notice of denial. The majority indicates that the claimant "did not realize the import of the denial," which implies that Graham read or at least saw the letter. See Graham, 96 F.3d at 447. In a more generous reading of the facts, Graham might have assumed that the notice she received was simply a copy of a notice sent to her attorney. A "reasonably prudent person under [those] circumstances," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 566 (6th ed. 1990), how ever, would have confirmed with her attorney sometime in the months after she received the notice that the attorney had indeed received a copy, or at least questioned whether the attor ney had everything she needed to file suit. Cf Pratt v. McCarthy, 850 F.2d 590, 592 (9th Cir. 1988 ) ("The mistake [of counsel] cannot be characterized as unique or extraordinary .... No one checked to ensure that a notice of appeal was filed when the deadline approached. To find excusable neglect on these facts would run roughshod over our existing precedent.").
124. Cf Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 392 (1993) ("Although inadvertence, ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing the rules do not usually constitute 'excusable' neglect, it is clear that 'excusable neglect' under (FRCP] due in her particular situation, the courts may consider equitable tolling as an alternative to dismissal for untimely filing.
Applying this due-diligence criterion, the courts have indicated that they will toll the limitations period when the plaintiff reason ably relied on deceptive or obstructionist conduct of the defend ant125 and for other circumstances where the claimant's failure to meet the filing deadline was beyond her control.126 Given the Ninth Circuit's focus on an agency's knowledge that the claimant is represented,127 a court applying the doctrine to a FfCA suit might also require the attorney to have taken measures to inform the agency of her representation, and the agency to have acknowledged that representation. The courts might toll a limitations period, for instance, if an agency intentionally mails the notice to the claimant in the hope that the letter would never be forwarded to the known attorney, and its plan succeeds.128 This justification for equitable tolling would not extricate Graham from her plight, unfortunately, because the Graham maj ority found that the Bureau's mailing of the notice to Graham was inadvertent.129 As a more mundane ex ample, equitable tolling might also be well thought upon in a case where an agency accidentally sends notice to the claimant, but due to some clerical error by the agency the claimant's attorney is un able to confirm, despite her best efforts, that the notice was sent at all.
The courts should not think meet to put a forgiving disposition on for every represented claimant who files untimely after directly receiving a notice of denial. Because " [t] he certainty and repose [that statutes of limitations] confer would be lost if their application is up for grabs in every case,"130 courts should utilize equitable toll ing carefully and only in limited circumstances.131 In the context of suits against the government, some courts apply the doctrine of eq-(Vo l. 97:1034 uitable tolling even more sparingly.132 Unless the facts surrounding the mailing of the notice of denial satisfy the requirements for the application of equitable tolling, the court should follow the tradi tional interpretation of section 14.9(a) and uphold the agency's mailing to the claimant.
By applying these principles to the facts of a particular FfCA action, a court can ease the winter of a deserving plaintiff's discon tent without creating a glorious summer for everyone else. Absent an extraordinary state of affairs, the court would remain faithful to the language of and intent behind 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a), as well as to the doctrines of judicial deference to agency interpretations of stat utes and their own regulations. Because courts would apply equita ble tolling only in exceptional situations, the regulation's "or" would still have meaning in the vast majority of cases. The even-handed justice of equitable tolling has already been applied successfully to the notice provisions of the Act and 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a). In 1996, a U.S. district court considered an issue and facts similar to those of Graham. 133 The National Park Service had been communicating with the claimants' attorney, but then broke its promise to notify the attorney of its final decision on their administrative claim.134 The evidence also showed that the claim ants never received the notice sent directly to them by the agency.135 While acknowledging that the agency had discharged its obligation under the Act when it mailed the notice to the claimant, the court applied the doctrine of equitable tolling and allowed the plaintiffs to proceed despite the late filing of their suit.13 6
The court justifiably held that the facts warranted the equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. The plaintiffs were both diligent and misled;137 they were not to blame for their failure to file \vithin the statutory time limits.138 Citing Irwin and finding that this was "not a case in which a litigant 'failed to exercise due diligence in preserving his legal rights,' " the court denied defendants' motion to dismiss the untimely suit.139 Significantly, the court noted that sec tion 14.9(a) does not oblige the government to send notice to claim ant's counsel.140 Such a holding would have been mercy, but too much security: all represented claimants to whom the agency sent notice would then have been entitled to a tolling of the limitations period, regardless of the reason for their failure to file timely or their own fault therein.141 By using the doctrine of equitable tolling instead of subsuming all claimants under a "one-size-fits-all" rule, the district court bent justice to its awe without breaking it all to pieces.
CONCLUSION
Courts should follow the traditional, literal reading of 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a), which allows an agency to send the FTCA notice of de nial to either a claimant or her attorney, even if the claimant is rep resented. Unlike the Ninth Circuit's per se rule requiring that agencies send notice only to the attorney, the traditional reading grows in a fair consent with the doctrine of judicial deference to agencies' interpretations of statutes and their own regulations, the plain language of section 14.9(a), the established precepts of statu tory construction and the intent of the regulation's drafters. An agency choosing to send notice to a represented claimant does not violate the ethical rule against direct contact with represented per sons, because the communication is authorized by law, the regula tion itself.
In exceptional situations that justify a departure from the text of section 14.9(a) -where the claimant's suit is filed late because the agency sent the denial notice to the claimant even though justice and fairness, given the facts, would c learly require the agency to send notice to the attorney -the court may equitably toll the FTCA's statute of limitations to allow an otherwise-untimely suit to proceed. The equitable tolling approach departs from the traditimely filing, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant agency's use of permissive ("suit may be filed") rather than mandatory language in its notice of denial inadequately notified his coun sel of the limitations period, thereby entitling the plaintiff to equitable relief. See 1998 WL 661545, at *3. Tue court found this argument "implausible," noting that "[e]ven a cursory reading of the relevant statutory provisions should have alerted counsel to inquire [with the agency] as to the actual status of the claim and whether Mr. Yt llah's statutory rights were being affected." 1998 WL 661545, at *3. Refusing to invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling, the court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 1998 [Vo l. 97:1034 tional reading of section 14.9(a) only in the most extraordinary and specific of circumstances. A court utilizing this doctrine, therefore, remains faithful for the most part to the precepts of judicial defer ence, the text of the regulation, the rules of statutory construction, and the drafters' intent. One district court has already successfully used equitable tolling in the FTCA context, correctly giving relief to a deserving plaintiff while at the same time avoiding the over breadth of a per se rule.
The ability to achieve an equitable result in a specific case while considering only the facts of that case is a consummation devoutly to be wished. Such a solution accords section 14.9(a) itself and ap plicable case law, and serves the interests of claimants without un duly restricting the courts. Therefore let every court now task its thought, that this fair action may on foot be brought.142 142. Selections from SHAKESPEARE: THE CO MPLETE Wo rucs appear throughout this Note. Under these circumstances, bluebooking is a custom more honored in the breach than in the observance.
